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The Anatomy of Boulwarism with a
Discussion of Forkosch
IRVING ABRAMSON*
After nine years of litigation it has finally been held that Boulwarism
as practiced by the General Electric Company during the 1960 negotia-
tions with the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Work-
ers, AFL-CIO-CLC (IUE), was an unlawful method of bargaining.'
Prefatory Statement
The National Labor Relations Board had found GE guilty of violating its
duty to bargain in four areas of conduct:
(1) Its failure to furnish the union with certain information dur-
ing contract negotiations.
(2) Its attempts to deal separately with locals on matters that
were properly the subject of national negotiations and its
solicitation of locals separately to abandon or refrain from
supporting the strike.
(3) Its presentation of an insurance proposal to the union on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.
(4) The overall approach to and conduct of bargaining dubbed
"Boulwarism."
2
This paper will concern itself only with the last of the enumerated is-
sues-the Boulware method of bargaining-which sired the "fair, firm" of-
fer, in effect the equivalent and alter ego of "take-it-or-leave-it," about
which there has been no dearth of literature.8 The Intermediate Report
* General Counsel, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Work-
ers, AFL-CIO-CLC. LL.B., St. John's School of Law, 1930; Member New York bar.
1. NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969) enforcing 150
N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), cert. denied 90 S. Ct. 995 (1970), petition for rehearing denied,
- S. Ct. - (1970). The hearing consumed 10,000 pages of testimony and a massive
number of exhibits. The Intermediate Report which contained 85 pages included an
exhaustive analysis of GE's method of bargaining since Boulware spawned it in 1948.
2. NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. at 193.
3. See, e.g., L. BoULWARE, Tie TRUTH ABOUT BOULWAPJSM (1969); J. HEALY,
Catholic University Law Review
contained 26 separate bad faith findings related to GE's conduct during
the negotiations. 4 While those findings may properly be used as ingredients
in a finding of overall bad faith, they will not be considered in this paper in
evaluating Boulwarism as a bargaining technique. They will be dealt
with only to describe the Boulware method wherever the conduct would
appear to be part of the Boulware modus operandi.
The reader is put on notice that the writer personally sat at the negotiating
table with GE and represented the contending union in its attack on Boul-
warism. The writer makes no pretense at nonpartisanship. After many
months of exposure at the "bargaining" table with GE no one but an
intellectual eunuch may claim to deal dispassionately with the issues of
Boulwarism. The writer, however, will make a fitting effort to transcend
an intimate personal experience with Bouwarism in order to treat the sub-
ject as objectively as possible.
The ultimate but penumbral holding of the court was that "an employer
may not so combine 'take-it-or-leave-it' bargaining methods with a widely
publicized stance of unbending firmness that he is himself unable to alter a
position once taken." 5  Before stating the majority holding, Judge Kauf-
man, in what appears to be an attempt to reassure Judge Friendly (dis-
senting) explicated: "We do not today hold that an employer may not
communicate with his employees during negotiations. Nor are we deciding
that the 'best offer first' bargaining technique is forbidden."6  The court's
holding as above stated related to GE's overall failure to bargain in good
CREATIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 58 (1965); H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARIsM, THE LABOR
RELATIONS POLICIES OF THE GENERAL ELECTRIC Co., THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACTION (1964); Blum, Collective Bargaining: Ritual or
Reality, 39 HARv. Bus. REV. 63 (1961); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law In Search of
Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 248 (1964); Forkosch, "Take It Or Leave It," As A Bar-
gaining Technique, 18 LAB. L.J. 676 (1967); Marcus, The Employer's Duty to Bargain:
Counterproposal v. Concession, 17 LAB. L.J. 541 (1966); Selekman, Cynicism and
Managerial Morality, 36 HARV. Bus. REV. 61 (1958); Boulwarism-Legality and
Effect, 76 HARV. L. REV. 807 (1962); Collective Bargaining, 43 TEXAS L. REV.
974 (1965); N.W.U. L. REV. 40 (1968); 40 N.Y. L. REV. 798 (1965).
4. In addition to an overall finding of bad faith, NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 150
N.L.R.B. at 269, the Trial Examiner made the following bad faith findings inter alia:
misrepresentation of union proposals, id. at 215, 216; failure to tender cost information,
id. at 261; activities to undermine the union as bargaining agent, id. at 263; separate
dealings during negotiations with fractions of bargaining unit, id. at 264; haste in releas-
ing offer directly to employees and to other unions, id. at 271; unilateral determination
of employment terms, id. at 272; attacking union and its leadership with misrepresenta-
tions of fact, id. at 276; presenting to employees different arguments from those pre-
sented at bargaining table, id. at 277; playing on fears and insecurities of employees, id.
at 277; communication system designed to undermine employee faith in union leader-
ship and bargaining process, id. at 277; for others see id. at 279, 282, 283.




faith, i.e., the Boulware charge. 7 Judge Kaufman's reference to the "take-
it-or-leave-it method" (Emphasis added) in his holding supports the Board's
finding that GE's overall bargaining method was predicated on its thresh-
hold "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude, even though it went through the motions
of bargaining. 8 Although the overall bargaining charge involved GE's use
of the "fair, firm offer," Judge Kaufman's reference to the "take-it-or-
leave-it" and the "fair, firm" offer was a recognition of one as de facto
equal to the other.10
Both the Board and court decisions leave some questions unanswered.
Albeit the Board found GE's "overall conduct" violated its duty to bar-
gain" as mandated by the law, 2 would any one or more parts of the Boul-
ware technique separately practiced offend the law? What part of Boul-
warism survived its judicial interment? Before entering into a discussion
of its legal standing, it would be ufeful to anatomize in detail the Boulware
method of collective bargaining, its genesis, and underlying purpose.
The Future Use of Boulwarism Forecast
The marketing of Boulwarism to American industry13 and the denigrating,
if not apocalyptic, characterization by Boulware's spokesman of the Board's
remedial order as "inconsequential and perfunctory,"'14 forecast the con-
tinued use of Boulwarism by GE. The Board issued its Decision and Order
on December 16, 1964. Undaunted by the Board's order, however, GE
continued its special brand of "bargaining" into the 1969 negotiations. Ac-
cording to a charge filed by the IUE, GE applied Boulwarism with
more vigor and in a more egregious fashion during the 1969 negotiations
7. Id. at 756-63.
8. 150 N.L.R.B. at 194.
9. 418 F.2d 756.
10. "This plan [Boulwarism] had two major facets: first, a take-it-or-leave-it ap-
proach ("fair, firm offer") to negotiations in general which emphasized both the power-
lessness and uselessness of the Union to its members, and second, a communications
program that pictured the Company as the true defender of the employees' interests,
further denigrating the Union, and sharply curbing the Company's ability to change
its own position." Id.
11. 150 N.L.R.B. at 193.
12. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
9(a). National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1964).
13. L. BOULWARE, THE TRUTH ABOUT BOULWARISM, 158 (1969); H. NORTHRUP,
BouLwARISM, THE LABOR RELATIONS POLICIES OF THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACTION, preface and p. 159
(1964). Professor Northrup was a member of GE's employee relations staff during
the administration of Boulwarism.
14. H. NORTHRUP, supra note 13, at 105.
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than it did in 1960.15 The IUE charged that not even the decision handed
down on October 28, 1969, by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, enforcing the Board's order, altered the Boulwaristic "bargaining"
course that GE had chosen to follow since 1948.16
To resolve any doubts about its continued adherence to the Boulware
method, the Company, on June 16, 1969, just prior to the start of negotia-
tions, issued a special supplement to its regular internal management news-
letter, Relations Reviews, in which it reaffirmed Boulwarism and its modus
operandi. The supplement was released at the same time to the Bureau
of National Affairs for publication.17 Thus, in view of the continued exist-
ence contemplated for Boulwarism, an examination of its anatomy would be
more useful than a postmortem of the corpus that was thought to have
been laid to rest by its judicial interment.
Genesis and Creator
As a result of a national strike against GE in 1946, Lemuel R. Boulware
was selected by GE President Charles E. Wilson to decide on a new ap-
proach to labor relations and collective bargaining. Following the birth of
the bargaining technique that bears his name, he was elevated to Vice-
President of Employee and Plant Community Relations.' 8 Boulware saw
the strike of 1946 as the result of GE's failure to apply its merchandising
principles to its management of labor relations and resolved "to do whatever
was necessary to achieve ultimately the same success in job marketing that
we [GE] accomplished in product marketing." 19 He saw his task as the
need to eliminate the "obsolete vestiges of paternalism," to exclude from
the bargaining process "eastern bazaar bargaining" and "facing up to the re-
grettable and distasteful but vitally necessary task" of correcting any "un-
warranted confidence in any unsound proposals by union officials."
The new approach mandated that "doing right voluntarily" was not
enough. It was necessary as well to have it known that GE "did right
voluntarily. ' 20 This declaration became Boulware's fiat for the single most
important element of his bargaining formula-the communication system
15. BNA, DLR Nov. 5, 1969, pp. A 1-2. See charges filed by IUE, Case No. 2-
CA- 11911.
16. GE had filed its petition for a Writ of Certiorari. The Board would not
initiate contempt proceedings while the petition was pending before the Supreme Court.
17. The entire supplement is published under the title, The History and Development
of Our Employee Relations Philosophy and Union Bargaining Approach: How It
Evolved over the Years & Works Today in 1969 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBoox 68
(1970).
18. H. NORTHRUP, supra note 13 at 26, 27.
19. Id. at 28.
20. id. at 27.
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by which his product, the "fair, firm" offer was sold, through what the
court described as "a veritable avalanche of publicity, reaching awesome
proportions prior to and during negotiations."'
' z
Although on its face Boulwarism appears to be just a bargaining tech-
nique, the results that follow in its wake involve vital social and political as
well as economic considerations that extend far beyond the bargaining
method. The author of Boulwarism appears to have been fully aware of
these considerations. A fair reading of Mr. Boulware's own justification of
his technique clearly establishes the extent to which his social and political
convictions influenced his authorship of the bargaining method.22 Boul-
ware's predilections about unions reflect the antediluvian concept that they
were agents of Socialism, fully committed to undermining private owner-
ship; that many of the union organizers were dyed in the wool Socialist
Revolutionaries who utilized "the basic socialist party line in order [to] dis-
credit ... private business in both the material and the non-material areas."' 23
Boulware's political and philosophical bias against unions and their lead-
ership wove its way into the job merchandising program of GE,2 4 and was
the subject of a number of findings by the Trial Examiner. 25 The Trial
Examiner found inter alia that GE manifested "a deliberate design to un-
dermine employee faith and confidence in the Union's leadership and in the
efficacy of the collective bargaining process; '26 that GE pursued "The tactic of
attacking the motives of the IUE leadership [which] had been decided upon as
a communications approach long in advance of the negotiations. '27 The
company's employee communication system stressed the "selfish," "irre-
sponsible" leadership and their "political motives."
28
Boulware looked upon the union shop as another form of monopoly
which invites "possible control by racketeers and protected demagogues."
'29
He both lamented and attacked the provision of the National Labor Re-
lations Act that grants unions the right to act as the "sole bargaining"
representative of the employees on the ground that it vests in unions a
21. 418 F.2d at 740.
22. L. BOULWARE, THE TRUTH ABOUT BouLwARIsM, chs. 15 THE AFTERMATH,
99-102, 17, POLITICAL BARGAINING 106-16, 20, WHOSE JOB 158-67 (1969).
23. Id. at 100.
24. In a full page advertisement at Pinelas Park, Florida, GE appealed to its em-
ployees to oppose IUE stating that "the union organizing campaign is part of an effort
to gain economic and eventual strength in Pinelas County and the entire state." Gen-
eral Counsel's Exhibit 90, at 20, Col. 2-4, Case No. 2-CA-7581.
25. See note 4, supra.
26. 150 N.L.R.B. at 277.
27. Id. at 276.
28. Id. at 277.
29. L. BouLwARE, supra note 13, at 129.
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"tight monopoly" and is the basic source of a union official's vast eco-
nomic power.
30
Boulware's anti-union bias had its impact on the substance of contract
settlements with unions and cut into normally accepted contract areas. The
union shop or any other form of union security is declared by GE to be out
of bounds on the asserted ground that it offends the company's "princi-
ples" which eschew compulsion in any form and violates the individual
freedoms of its employees. Except for disciplinary cases and other limited
areas, GE resists arbitration of grievances arising under the administration of
a contract including rates of pay.3 ' GE insists on reserving to itself the
right to modify wages up or down during the administration of the contract,
justifying this policy by giving the union the right to strike following the
exhaustion of grievance procedures.
3 2
GE's contracts with all unions for the most part substitute the right to
strike for arbitration as a method of settling grievances. It will adhere
rigidly to its pro-strike versus arbitration policy despite serious production
losses which according to the company run at the staggering annual rate
of 6,000,000 man hours.3 3  In 1966, GE made the claim that a large
number of the grievance strikes in that year were attributable to the union's
attempt "to build up an argument in favor of broader arbitrability of griev-
ances."3 4 The general impact of the anti-union bias inherent in Boulwarism
is reflected also by the number of unfair labor practices of which GE has
been found guilty. They include violations of almost every section of the
law.3 5
30. id. at 111. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1964) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such pur-
poses, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
Boulware erroneously refers to it as the "sole bargaining" provision of the statute.
31. The GE-IUE contract contains 17 limitations on the right to arbitrate and
removes inter alia from arbitration, disputes over job classifications, rates of pay, and
incentive standards (Art. XV). See also H. NORTHRUP, supra note 13, at 185-91.
32. GE's insistence on reserving and exercising this right is the basis of a union
charge of violation of Section 8(a)(5) bottomed by the claim that such broad reser-
vation of rights consists of unilateral control of wages-the most important ingredient
in a labor contract. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 739, 746.
33. General Electric News, at 6.
34. Id.
35. The following is a list of some of the cases decided during the period 1965-69:
The Boulware case, 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964) enforced 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969)
cert. denied 90 S. Ct. 995 petition for rehearing denied - S. Ct. - (1970); Refusal
to bargain, 173 N.L.R.B. 22 enforced 414 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied




The General Electric Company is the largest manufacturer of electrical
products.8 6  It employs 290,000 persons in the United States 7 and
400,000 worldwide. 8 It is the most diversified industrial complex in this
country, manufacturing products in 128 different lines including almost every
basic industry.39  The company carries on vast foreign operations in 102
plants in 25 countries on every continent of the world except Antarctica.4 0
It does business with more than 100 international and local unions of
which the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers




How the Offer is Prepared
GE's modus operandi, before making an offer, is to seek through research all
pertinent facts to permit it to determine what is "right" for its employees.
Its research includes a study of business conditions, competitive factors
and economic trends. It includes a determination of its employees' needs
and desires through independent employee attitude surveys, comments made
by employees at informative meetings, direct discussions by supervisors
with employees and statements in union publications. When bargaining be-
gins, the company as part of its overall research, listens to the presentation
made by the union and evaluates the union's demands with the help of all
the facts it has on hand, including those supplied by the union.
42
On the basis of its study so made, GE makes its own determination of
what is "right." It then makes an offer which-as it declares to all unions
N.L.R.B. 912 enforced 383 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1967); refusal to recognize coordinated
bargaining committee, 173 N.L.R.B. 46 (1968) enforced 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969);
denial of union right to make collections and support grape pickers' strike, 169 N.L.R.B.
155 (1968); refusal to bargain by maintaining inflexible position on wages, refusing
to negotiate during strike and to supply bargaining information, company surveillance
of union activities, threats and interrogation because of union activity, granting wage
increase to defeat union and the destruction of a union by resort to unfair labor
practices, 163 N.L.R.B. 30 (1967) enforced 400 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1968); discipline
because of union activity, 149 N.L.R.B 1541 (1964) enforced sub nom NLRB v.
Caribe GE, 357 F.2d 664 (1st Cir., 1966); retaliatory discipline because of employees'
testimony before NLRB, 155 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1965); unlawful surveillance and inter-
rogation, 150 N.L.R.B. 829 (1965).
36. 418 F.2d at 740.
37. General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 514 (1969).
38. 1968 GE ANNUAL REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS 26.
39. FORTUNE, Plant and Products Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corpora-
tions (1966).
40. INTERNATIONAL METAL WORKERS FEDERATION, PROFILE OF GENERAL ELECTRIC
Co. (March 1969).
41. 150 N.L.R.B. at 205.
42. Id. at 208.
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and to its employees-includes everything it finds to be warranted with
nothing held back for trading or compromising. As explicated by GE re-
cently, the offer will be modified only "in the light of new, or overlooked,
facts" 43 which do not include "strike threats, rejection by union officials, and
[Government] intervention."' 44  Compromise during bargaining, ridiculed
as "concessioneering," has no place in GE's bargaining lexicon.4 5
The Making of the Offer
Before actually making the offer, GE will request a meeting of UE officials
where it will unveil the offer to be given the next day to all of the 100 unions
it deals with. 46 It will accordingly make the offer to IUE and at or about
the same time issue substantially identical offers to all of the other unions
and the press. It will reject the union's request for an opportunity to study
the offer and to give GE its comments before the company distributes it to
the public.
47
The company thereupon dispels any doubts about the finality of the
"fair, firm" offer by putting it into effect for non-represented employees,
communicating at the same time the message that any delay by union lead-
ers in accepting the offer is a costly union neglect for the reason that there
will be no retroactivity when the union finally sees the light.48  In the pe-
riod that follows, each of the 100 separate and disjointed unions will be
whipsawed against the other until the substantially identical offer is ac-
cepted.
49
43. 71 LAB. REL. 194, 1969 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 74 (1970).
44. Id. at 195.
45. Id. at 194. Judge Kaufman gave the following description of GE's slavish
adherence to its no compromise policy: The Company, having created a view of the
bargaining process that admitted of no compromise, was trapped by its own creation.
It could no longer seek peace without total victory, for it had by its own words and ac-
tions branded any compromise a defeat.
418 F.2d at 760.
46. See, e.g., 150 N.L.R.B. at 225.
47. Id. at 227. On August 29, 1960, and even prior to the offer preview meeting
that night, GE assembled all of its plant managers. Each of them was given a
package containing a script of a tape recording discussing the proposal, slides to be
used in explaining it to the employees, a form letter to be used in making the offer to
other unions, a series of questions and answers about the proposals; a GE News Spe-
cial Edition describing the 1960 program in detail; a model newspaper ad designed to
extol the virtues of the proposal to each community and a document entitled Commu-
nication Program Information, which adverted to other bulletins to be distributed to
employees, highlighting features of the offer, letters to employees' homes, press re-
leases and radio and television messages. Id.
48. H. NORTHRUP, supra note 13, at 54, 55. See also General Elec. v. NLRB,
412 F.2d 512, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1969).
49. See General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 514 (1969); McLeod v. General




To insure its acceptance, GE at the time the offer is made, launches a mas-
sive and overwhelming communication campaign intended to reach not only
the community but the home of each employee as well. The linchpin of
the Boulware approach is to bring GE's side of the story home to its
employees and to the general public. The overwhelming character of the
communication program upon which GE relies to the "virtual exclusion of
genuine negotiations," was described by the court as ". . . a veritable
avalanche of publicity, reaching awesome proportions prior to and during
negotiations. . . . [A] vast network of plant newspapers, bulletins, letters,
television and radio announcements, and personal contacts through manage-
ment personnel." 50
GE assures its supervisors that if its offer is "fair" and the homework has
been done right, the employees can not only be expected to support it, but
will pressure their union officials, who, if they are responsible-"will seek
feedback and act on it."'51 The intended end product of this vast and awe-
some campaign is to insure GE's freedom from strikes upon contract termi-
nation which GE cynically suggests "should be of major value to union
officials." GE concludes its brochure on Boulwarism with the triumphant
note that it succeeded in having no company-wide strike since 1946, except
for the "abortive" strike of 1960.52
In its communications, GE points up the "theoretical" character of the
collective bargaining it exercises. In a prepared question and answer
brochure, Boulware as GE's Vice President, posits the bizarre version of bar-
gaining in which the union is accorded a theoretical standing and under
which it is the employees who act as their own bargaining agent:
Theoretically, the union officials are bargaining with manage-
ment. Practically, however, it is the employees who are bargaining
with customers-bargaining as to what customers are able and
willing to pay for the work General Electric employees do as com-
pared with the price at which they can buy the results of com-
peting employees' work elsewhere in this country or abroad.58
The court found that the aim of Boulwarism is "to deal with the Union
50. 418 F.2d at 740, 741. A typical employee at some of the larger plants received
over 100 written communications during September and October. On many days he
received up to four GE messages, not including oral discussions and meetings with
supervisors. Id. at n.14.
51. GE Relations Reviews, 71 LAB. REL. REP. at 195, 1969 LABOR RELMrTONS YEAR-
BOOK 75 (1970).
52. Id.
53. GE's Communicators Exchange, April 29, 1960, General Counsel's Exhibit 109-
13, at 2, Case No. 2-CA-7519, reported in 150 N.L.R.B. 192.
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through the employees, rather than with the employees through the Union."'54
Boulwarism Denies a Union the Statutory Right to be a Participant
in Fixing Terms of Employment
The vice in Boulwarism is that the union is accorded only the role of a
source of additional information and is excluded from any meaningful
participation in the determination of the terms to be included in the con-
tract which the union is being asked to sign. It conceives meetings with the
union merely as "listening" sessions, forming but one phase of the "research"
upon which GE "makes its unilateral determination" of what is "right" for
incorporation into its "fair, firm" offer.55 Collective "bargaining" as prac-
ticed under Boulwarism is thus a mere formality and serves to transform
the role of the statutory representative from a joint participant in the bar-
gaining process to that of an advisor.56 The Boulware doctrine and its ap-
proach to bargaining, no matter how fair its "fair, firm" offer or how im-
partial its method in arriving at it, produce inevitably total unilateral con-
trol by the employer of its distributive power.57 The "bargaining" process
under these conditions becomes all form without substance-not only
"moot, but morte."
One of the intended by-products of Boulwarism and GE's benchmark of
its successful application, is the prevention of company-wide strikes, as
distinguished from local grievance strikes.5 8 The denial of the statutory
and constitutional right to strike can take many forms. The use of thugs
and spies uncovered by the hearings that gave rise to the statutory protec-
tion of this basic right, while outdated, can take on more subtle forms
and ingenious devices. The stated aim of Boulwarism to prevent strikes
applied also, it would appear, to breaking them when they started. The
IUE engaged in a three-week strike aborted by the successful efforts of the
company to break it. The Trial Examiner found that: "Apart from being
in derogation of the Union's agency status, the Respondent's conduct... con-
stituted . . . unlawful solicitations to induce employee abandonment of the
strike." 59 It did so through the medium of holding out special benefits of
more favorable settlement conditions to part of the bargaining unit; through
a communication program to discredit the motives of the union's leader-
54. 418 F.2d at 759.
55. 150 N.L.R.B. at 270.
56. Id. at 195-96.
57. See Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law In Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
248, 291 (1964).
58. 71 LAB. REL. REP. at 195, 1969 LABOR RELATIONS Yr.B&, ooK 75 (1970).
59. 150 N.L.R.B. at 266.
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ship inducing and encouraging nonsupport of the union's bargaining and
strike decisions; and through attempts to negotiate separately with locals
and solicit their abandonment of the strike. 60
The findings by the Trial Examiner of strike breaking, isolated from all
the other facets of Boulwarism, may not perhaps generate serious concern
for the fate of free trade unionism. When strike breaking, however, is con-
sidered as one part of an overall management scheme to negate effective
bargaining participation and so to undermine a union as to emasculate its
ability to exercise any countervailing power, such an overall scheme, if ac-
corded legal acceptance, would eat away at the vitals of a free democratic
society.
A program designed to sap the employees' will to strike as a part of the
bargaining approach is at odds with the statutory precepts of free collective
bargaining. The Supreme Court in International Insurance Agents,6l stressed
the right of labor to possess and use its countervailing economic power as
part of the collective bargaining process: "[T]he use of economic pressure
by the parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception to some policy
of completely academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel
of the process of collective bargaining."'6 2 Balanced economic pressure is
"a prime motive for agreement in free collective bargaining."6  It is an in-
tegral part of the democratic capitalistic system in which we function. The
characteristic thing about a free democratic society is its diffusion of power
among the people and it is no historic accident that in the totalitarian states
of both the left and right, trade unions are servile and weak institutions
that exist at the will and under the domination of the employer and the
state.64
The National Labor Relations Act, in haec verba declares its purpose to
be the restoration of the equality of bargaining power between employers
and employees.6 5 The Supreme Court very early held the equality of
60. Id.
61. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960).
62. Id. at 495.
63. G. TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 18 (1959),
quoted with approval in NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489
(1960).
64. See BRADY, BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER, Chs. VIII, IX (1943).
65. Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees
to orgainze and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing cer-
tain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging prac-
tices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising
out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by
restoring equality of bargaining power....
National Labor Relations Act, Findings and Declaration of Policy, Section 1.
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bargaining power between "capital and labor" to be the aim of the Act. 66
According to Archibald Cox, "The most important purpose of the Wagner
Act was to create aggregations of economic power on the side of employees
countervailing the existing power of corporations to establish labor stand-
ards."
67
Collective bargaining has been said to be the extension of the basic prin-
ciples of democracy into industry through unions, and an instrument
through which workers seek to replace the "system of corporate industrial
dictatorship" with one involving equal and democratic participation in the
redistribution of the proceeds of collective bargaining. 68 The legislative his-
tory behind the National Labor Relations Act strongly suggests that the free
exercise of employees' rights under the proposed Act was to be the basis
for the industrial and political democracy intended by the Act.69 A bar-
gaining technique which has for its intended results the divestiture of real,
as distinguished from illusory, union participation in establishing terms
and conditions of employment, and the paralysis of its economic power, is
hostile to the stated purpose and principles of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
The most cogent indictment, both moral and legal, of Boulware's re-
fusal to permit effective union participation in bargaining was stated by the
prestigious Professor Selekman:
. . . if the aim is to "cut a union down to size," to beat union lead-
ership to the punch, then indeed the strategy is tantamount to a
Machiavellian use of power to discredit and, if possible, to de-
stroy the union. It denies workers adequate and competent repre-
sentation, for such tactics will never afford leaders an oppor-
tunity for development and growth. Indeed, the most serious
moral defect of Boulwareism lies precisely in the fact that it de-
prives a human institution of the opportunity to grow in maturity
and responsibility. . . . The best way for union members and
leaders to acquire knowledge of the complex economic, political,
and social factors at work is to learn through the negotiation and
administration of agreements. But Boulwareism affords them
little or no opportunity to undergo such an experience. It pre-
sents them with a "take it or leave it" ultimatum. 70
66. American Steel Foundries v. Tri City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184,
209 (1921). See also NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 507
(1960) (Frankfurter, J.).
67. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV., 1401, 1407
(1958).
68. See C. GOLDEN & H. RUrENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUsTRIAL DEMOCRACY,
XXIV, 22 (1942).
69. S. REP. No. 1184, 73 Cong. 2d Sess. (1934).
70. Selekman, Cynicism and Managerial Morality, 36 HARV. Bus. REv. 61, 64-65
(1958). See also Blum, Collective Bargaining: Ritual or Reality, 39 HARV. BUS.
REV. 63, 66 (1961).
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Boulwarism's crucial blow, according to Professor James J. Healy, is that
its labor relations is strictly unilateral and "by its nature it flouts the union's
responsibility for the employees."' 71 Even before the enactment of the
Act, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in testimony before the U.S. Commission on In-
dustrial Relations, 72 spoke out for joint participation by unions and man-
agement in negotiating employment conditions.
The vice of unilateral control and the denial of joint participation by the
union and the employer was pointed up in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Lumbard in NLRB v. Katz, which became the position of the Supreme
Court: "the failure to notify the union if there has been an opportunity
to do so must in all but the most extreme circumstances signify an intent to
deny the employees any role in decision-making with respect to the par-
ticular condition of employment which is involved."7  Congress expressed
the same concern in protecting the right of an employer to be a joint par-
ticipant in the decision making processes of collective bargaining in the en-
actment of Section 8(b) (3 ).74 Decisional law and the literature on the
subject matter lends convincing support to the need for effective participation
in the decisional processes of establishing conditions of employment if the
statutory standard of good faith bargaining is to be met.
Test of Good Faith Bargaining
Prefatory Statement
Before discussing the statutes applicable to good faith bargaining require-
ments and the cases decided thereunder, a few preliminary observations
may be appropriate concerning some of the legal issues raised by Boul-
warism.
Although the term Boulwarism has been extensively used as part of the
jargon by writers on the subject matter, it was given its judicial christen-
ing in the Second Circuit's decision. "Boulwarism," said Judge Kaufman,
"became the hallmark of the company's entire attitude toward its em-
ployees."' 75  (Emphasis added.) Boulware's own "Truth About Boulwar-
71. J. HEALY, CREATIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 56-59 (1965). See also Duvin,
The Duty to Bargain: Law In Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 291 (1964).
72. S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong. 1st Sess. 7659-60 (1916), quoted in Bakke, Kerr
& Anrod, UNIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 233 (2d ed. 1960).
73. 289 F.2d 700, 712 (2d Cir. 1961).
74. Senator Ellender, 93 Cong. Rec. 4135, 4581, 2 Leg. Hist. LMRA 1947, 1062,
1244; Senator Knowland, 93 Cong. Rec. 4365, 2 Leg. Hist. LMRA 1947, 1172; Sena-
tor Morse, 93 Cong. Rec. 1844, 2 Leg. Hist. LMRA 1947, p. 982; Senator Taft, 93
Cong. Rec. 3858, 2 Leg. Hist. LMRA 1012 (1947).
75. 418 F.2d at 740.
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ism ''76 lends convincing support to Judge Kaufman's explication of the term
as positing an "attitude," approach or general philosophy of industrial labor
relations in its broadest terms.
Boulwarism's claim to distinction lies not only in its broad sweep but in
the novelty of its approach. It is truly sui generis. A determination of the
legal standing of the bargaining formula in question must include some-
thing more than examination of precedents as applied to an unprecedented
bargaining tactic. In such an examination the rule of stare decisis must
give way to the rule of reason and the underlying purpose of the applicable
law. 77 Judge Friendly's dissent, for example, is bottomed on his accept-
ance of the outworn "willingness to agree" standard while at the same time
he objects to the "totality of conduct" test relied on by the Board and the
Court.78 Board member Jenkins would hold that it is not bad faith to
embark on a "take-it-or-leave-it" position or to enter into negotiations with
a fixed position from which it is proposed through "hard bargaining" not
to retreat. 79 The writer suggests that these needlepoint distinctions obfus-
cate the real thrust of the issue. The arguments advanced by the dis-
senters are based on the erroneous hypothesis that the employer in the
case then under consideration formulated a bargaining position after due
consideration was given to a specific bargaining demand by a specific union.
The issue to be met is that posed by a bargaining technique structured,
not to meet the bargaining issues at any one bargaining table with any one
union, but a bargaining formula to be applied with equal and inexorable
force to every bargaining table with any union, large or small, concerning
any dispute and without any consideration of the bargaining issues particu-
larized by an equal bargaining participant. Boulwarism as conceptualized
and practiced is a bargaining patent medicine prescribed beforehand for
every bargaining ill. The diagnosis never varies and the prognosis is always
predictable.
Board Member Jenkins attacks the majority decision on the ground that
"the opinion . . . fails to distinguish between two important concepts; viz,
the formulation of a settlement position and the techniques employed in
reaching a settlement."' 80 The distinguished Board Member, however, fell
76. L. BOULWARE, THE TRUTH ABOUT BOULWARISM: TRYihN TO Do RIGHT VOL-
UNTARILY (1969).
77. See Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387 (1898); DiSanta v. Penn-
sylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 41 (1927) (dissenting opinion); Washington v. W.C. Dawson &
Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924).
78. 418 F.2d at 767.
79. 150 N.L.R.B. at 199.
80. 150 N.L.R.B. at 199.
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into the very error charged to the majority. It is the Boulware technique
that fails to make the asserted distinction. Each of its concepts, the offer
and the settlement is inseparable. They are preordained. They merge into
one single preconceived program with predetermined results. They flow
from the same fountain head.
A condition precedent to the application of any good faith bargaining
standard; indeed, a threshold standard, is the acceptance by the em-
ployer of the union. Acceptance must mean something more than the for-
mal statutory recognition of the union as a bargaining agent. The formally
recognized but unaccepted union is made to feel like a trespasser at the
bargaining table and the bargaining that follows is form without sub-
stance. It is GE's refusal to accept the union as an equal at the bargaining
table that explains its refusal to engage in good faith bargaining. All of
the proscribed conduct flows from this fundamental position. The techniques
'employed (the fair, firm offer and the communication system) to frustrate
the bargaining process are merely the syndromes by which the unlawful
conduct is identified.
The "acceptance of the union" standard is a subjective one and its
application involves the probing of the employer's mind. But every
other subjective good faith test involves the same process of determining the
intent of a person. In determining the employer's intent to accept the
union, the courts will give recognition to the expertise of the Labor
Board in dealing with a specialized field of knowledge, for which courts
will not substitute their judgment.8 ' The application of this standard,
like any other good faith bargaining test, requires the canvassing of the




There are three controlling sections that deal with an employer's duty to
bargain: Sections 7, 8(a)(5) and 8(d).88  Section 7 guarantees to em-
81. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951); NLRB v. Water-
man S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
82. NLRB v. Reed and Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134, 139 (1st Cir. 1963);
see also 76 HRv. L. REV. 807, 811 (1963).
83. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
'19701
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ployees the right to self organization and to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing. In measuring an employer's duty under
Section 7 to deal with a union freely chosen by his employees, the element
of good faith is not a consideration. Section 7 contains the congressional
guarantee that employees may freely and without employer influence bar-
gain through representatives of their own choosing. Good faith, therefore,
is no defense to a charge based on the refusal or the failure of an em-
ployer to recognize the union chosen by the employees. The selection of the
employees' bargaining representative, for example, is outside of the proper
limits of an employer's interest or inquiry.
84
We are concerned here, however, not with the employer who refuses to
recognize or meet with the representatives of the union, but with the
standard of conduct required when he meets for the ostensible purpose of
bargaining for terms and conditions of employment. Section 8(a)(5),
which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with representatives of his employees, must be read together
with Section 8(d) in fixing and measuring his obligation to bargain with
respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.
Those who support or lean heavily toward the contention that Congress
did not intend any interference with the conduct of union and management
negotiators (so long as they meet and discuss each other's demands) hark
back to the often quoted remarks of Senator Walsh, then Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Education. In substance, he stated that
all the law proposes to do is to escort the union representatives to the door
of the employer and what happens behind those doors will not be inquired
into.85 This unrealistic concept of bargaining would permit any behavior by
[8(a)(3)] ....
National Labor Relations Act § 7, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Section 8(d)
provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotia-
tion of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession ... .
National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
84. Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1960); American Laun-
dry Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 124, (6th Cir. 1949); NLRB v. Sunbeam Elec.
Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1943). See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743
(1962) for the holding that there is no occasion to consider the issue of good faith if
a party has refused even to negotiate in fact-to meet and confer on any mandatory
bargaining subject.
85. 79 CoNo. REc. 7660 (1935) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
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the parties at the bargaining table. It would insulate from regulation all
conduct of an employer (or of a union under Section 8(b)(3)) and
permit unscrupulous employers to subvert the law by stalling tactics and
talking the union to death.8 6 The Supreme Court disapproved Senator
Walsh's doorstep limitation on the regulation of bargaining conduct,
87
subject, however, to the caveat that the parties must be unrestricted by
any governmental power to regulate substantive provisions of their settle-
ment or the solution of their differences.88 A balance must therefore be
struck between Government regulation of bargaining and interference in
determining substantive terms.8 9
Good faith or the lack of it is a question of fact as to a state of mind and
is for the Labor Board to determine, subject to review only for substantial
evidence. 90 A determination of good faith or the want of it may rest only
on an inference based on more or less persuasive manifestations of an-
other's state of mind. Considering the complexities in determining one's
state of mind, it would appear necessary to accord to the Board a wide lati-
tude in its inquiry into the facts. Good faith-or the lack of it-must in
the absence of a per se violation depend on a factual determination based
on the overall conduct of the party charged. 91 Relevant facts would include
the relations of the parties, antecedent events explaining behavior at the
bargaining table, as well as during the period of negotiations.
9 2
There have been many criteria or tests advanced for finding the presence
of good or bad faith in collective bargaining. Reliance on any one of them
without due regard to the totality of the parties' conduct is often an
irresistible but hazardous temptation for the advocate. With this caveat
in mind, an examination of the tests laid down by the courts may be of
value in determining whether Boulwarism or any of the many parts that
make up its unique method of bargaining will survive one or more of
such tests.
The Supreme Court in Truitt Mfg. Co., laid down the rule which would
outlaw the predetermined "fair, firm" or "take-it-or-leave-it" offer that is
the hallmark of Boulwarism. Decisional law under Sections 8(a) (5) and
86. See 76 HAv. L. REV. 807, 810 (1963).
87. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960).
88. Id. at 488. See also H.K. Porter, 90 S. Ct. 821 (1970).
89. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
90. Local 833 UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1962), United Steel
Workers of America v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
91. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. at 505, 508; NLRB v. Reed
& Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d at 139.
92. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 155 (1956); cf. NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d at 139, 140.
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8(b)(3), which places a corresponding duty on the union vis a vis the
employer, spell out the following basic good faith obligation of the par-
ties: They must make an honest effort to come to terms; they are required
to reach an agreement in good faith; and they must do more than merely
go through the motions of negotiating. The foregoing good faith require-
ments are patently inconsistent with a predetermined resolve not to budge
from an initial position.93 Mr. Justice Frankfurter was quick to add to his
enunciation of the foregoing standards, that they are not necessarily
incompatible with stubbornness or even with what to an outsider may seem
unreasonableness, a reminder no doubt prompted by his holding that both
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) must be read together and that the latter sec-
tion is a limitation on the Board's power to find a violation of the
former.
9 4
Although the employer is not required under Section 8(d) of the Act to
make concessions, he must observe the following additional good faith re-
quirements: Avoid behavior which obstructs or inhibits the actual process
of discussion or reflects a cast of mind against arriving at an understand-
ing;95 discuss freely the respective contentions of the parties and attempt in
good faith to justify his position;9 6 approach the bargaining table with
an open mind and fairly consider opposing arguments and possible solu-
tions;9 7 honestly attempt to overcome obstacles;98 demonstrate a spirit of
cooperation;99 keep an open and fair mind;100 "collective bargaining is not
simply an occasion for purely formal meetings between management and
labor while each maintains an attitude of 'take-it-or-leave-it;' it presupposes
a desire to reach ultimate agreement to enter into a collective bargaining
contract."'' It is bad faith for a party to approach the bargaining table
with the desire not to reach an agreement, although conversely the desire to
reach an agreement considered by itself is not controlling as to his good
faith. 10 2 A refusal to make a counter proposal when asked to do so by the
union may be considered in finding bad faith,' 08 but it is not necessarily
93. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. at 154.
94. Id. at 155.
95. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962).
96. NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3rd Cir. 1941).
97. NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941); Globe Cotton
Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
98. NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 P.2d 210, 215-16 (8th Cir. 1965).
99. NLRB v. Atlantic Broadcasting Co., sub nom. NLRB v. Woodruff, 193 F.2d 641,
642 (5th Cir. 1952).
100. NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960).
101. 361 U.S. at 485.
102. 205 F.2d at 134.
103. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); NLRB v.
George P. Pilling, 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1961); see Cox and Marcus n.105, infra.
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a per se refusal to bargain.' 04
While recognition by the employer of the union as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent may satisfy the formalistic requirements of Section 7, something
more is mandated to satisfy the good faith bargaining requirement of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5). The latter requires in addition to recognition, the accept-
ance of the union as a joint and real participant in determining the condi-
tions of employment. A "take-it-or-leave-it" offer would not appear to be
a refusal to bargain in every circumstance. Intransigence by itself is not a
refusal to bargain and absent any other indicia of bad faith is protected by
Section 8(d) of the Act.' 05 A valid distinction may be drawn, however, be-
tween stubbornness or what may appear to be unreasonableness and the
Boulware predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position, the
latter being inconsistent with good faith bargaining.
"Willingness to Agree" Standard.
In the Boulware case the employer stoutly contended that the "fair, firm" or
"take-it-or-leave-it" method of dealing with a union could not violate the
law so long as the employer carries on its discussions with a desire to reach
an agreement. The test of good faith, GE argued, was its admitted willing-
ness to reach and sign an ultimate agreement.
Judge Friendly relied on Reed & Prince as the lead case in support of the
"unwillingness to agree" standard.'0 In that case the court found that "the
desire not to reach an agreement with the union" constitutes bad faith.
The error in the reasoning of the dissenting judge is his patent non sequitur,
viz: that if as a matter of law it is bad faith for an employer to enter nego-
tiations with his mind fixed against reaching an agreement, conversely a
finding of good faith must follow if the employer enters negotiations with
his mind fixed on getting an agreement. A desire not to enter into an
agreement is a per se violation of the Act while a desire to enter into an
agreement is but one element in a totality of circumstances, all of which
must be considered in determining the question of good or bad faith.107
104. NLRB v. Adler Metal Products, 79 N.L.R.B. 219 (1948).
105. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 155 (1956). See also Local 2647,
Lumber & Sawmill Workers, 130 N.L.R.B. 235, 239 (1961), enforced, sub nom. Che-
ney California Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1963). The take-it-or-
leave-it ultimatum in this case was presented after five months of bargaining and fol-
lowing an impasse, Id. at 380. Section 8(d), however, did not overrule the doctrine
that proof of a refusal to make a counter offer is admissible as evidence of bad faith.
See Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1401, 1421 (1958).
See also Marcus, The Employers Duty to Bargain: Counterproposal v. Concession,
17 LAB. L.J. 541, 542 (1966).
106. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953).
107. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l, 361 U.S. at 504.
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The "willingness to agree" standard can be a legalistic but empty formal-
ism if applied indiscriminately and without regard to all of the surrounding
facts and behavior of the parties.' 08 A desire to reach an agreement may
mean different things to different people but in the context of a meaningful
and purposeful reading of Section 8(a)(5), it must mean more than a
willingness to sign a piece of paper. 10 9
An ultimate agreement or the terms that go into it may not validate the
tactics employed to exact them. It is not the terms of a settlement that
determine whether the regulations governing bargaining have been complied
with. A signed contract, or an offer to do so, may not immunize conduct
which otherwise would violate the Act. It is the conduct of the parties
before and during negotiations that will determine whether the requirements
of the law have been met. Similarly, the content of a collective bargaining
agreement will not insulate an employer's unlawful and predetermined tactic
in achieving it."10
GE relied heavily on Insurance Agents International Union, supra, which
found that the policy of Congress was "to impose a mutual duty upon the
parties to confer in good faith with a desire to reach an agreement.""'
However, nothing stated by the court may reasonably be said to place its
imprimatur on the action of an employer who entered negotiations with its
mind cast against any change. The contrary is true. The court interdicted
conduct that reflects a predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial
position. The "willingness to agree" test of good faith was first established
during the very early Board cases, and at a time when it was primarily con-
cemed with the organizational and developmental stages of collective bar-
gaining.112
The modem and ingenious devices of Boulwarism were not before the
Labor Board in the earlier cases which dealt with the issue of the em-
ployer's intent or desire to reach an agreement. There is little doubt that
had the Board dealt with the Boulware formula in the earlier years that
Boulwarism would have met with a similar fate. In Atlas, for example, the
108. Id. See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (lst Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 1940); See also Duvin,
Duty to Bargain: Law In Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 248, 265 (1964); see
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAxv. L. REV. 1401, 1419 (1958); 76
HARv. L. REV. 807, 812-13 (1963).
109. 418 F.2d at 761.
110. See Address by Board Member Fanning, Ninth Annual Institute on Labor
Law, Oct. 19, 1962, 51 L.R.R.M. 87, 88 (1963).
111. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. at 488.
112. NLRB v. Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 10 (1937); NLRB v. Highland Park
Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939), enforcing 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940). See 43
TExAs L. Rnv. 974, 976 (1965).
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first of the cases that dealt with the "willingness to agree" standard, the
Board stated that if the obligation of the Act is to produce more than a
series of empty discussions, bargaining must mean more than mere negotia-
tion.
118
The first annual report of the Board declared that:
Collective bargaining is something more [than] the mere meeting
of an employer with the representatives of his employees; the es-
sential thereof is rather the serious intent to adjust differences to
reach an acceptable common ground.
114
Professor Duvin delivered a most appropriate eulogy to the "willingness to
agree" standard: "When restated in the light of modem industrial society it
is exposed as 'an antediluvian ineffective, legal standard which obstructs
rather than implements labor policy'."" 5
Section 8(c) as a Defense to GE's Communication System
In defense of its right to engage in its massive communication program, GE
advanced the proposition that Section 8(c)" 8 prohibits the Board from
grounding an unfair labor practice on communications that contain no threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. Absent the conduct proscribed
by Section 8(c) the right of an employer, GE argues, is privileged and as
such is protected under the Act. This absolutist concept of 8(c) found
some support in the dissenting opinion of Judge Friendly. There was noth-
ing wrong, according to the dissent, "in an employer's urging employees to
communicate with their representatives simply because the communication
is one the representatives do not want to hear." 117  This parochial view of
8(c) cannot be squared with the legislative history behind that section. 118
Moreover, it would render incompetent, evidence which would ordinarily
be deemed relevant and admissible in courts of law, with consequences for
the entire administration of the Act too dire to contemplate. 19 Its effect
113. 3 N.L.R.B. at 21.
114. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 85-86.
115. Davin, The Duty to Bargain: Law In Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REv.,
248, 265 (1964).
116. Section 8(c) provides that: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opin-
ion, or the dissemination thereof. . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice. . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit."
117. 418 F.2d at 771, 772.
118. 1 LEO. HIsT. 1541. See analysis of the legislative history cited in Judge Kauf-
man's opinion at 760 and the analysis of the Trial Examiner at 281. See also IBEW v.
NLRB, 341 U.S. 690, 701 n.6 (1951).
119. "The problem is essentially to determine from the record the intention or the
state of mind of respondents in the matter of their negotiations with the union."
NLRB v. National Shoes, Inc., 208 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Fitz-
gerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 1963).
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would be to emasculate a statute whose structure depends heavily on
evaluation of motive and intent.
120
Where no coercive speech is found to have been used in furtherance of
an unlawful purpose, the immunities of Section 8(c) do not apply. To put it
conversely, noncoercive speech is protected under 8(c) only when in further-
ance of a lawful object. The Supreme Court enunciated the rule of law
that "the remedial function of Section 8(c) is to protect noncoercive
speech by employer and labor organizations alike in furtherance of a lawful
object."'12 (Emphasis added).
Establishing the purpose of any given conduct of the employer, including
communications, oral or written, is of critical importance in determining
the good faith of an employer before or during bargaining sessions. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter stated: "The state of mind with which the party
charged with a refusal to bargain entered into and participated in the bar-
gaining process is the ultimate issue upon which alone the Board must act in
each case and, on the sufficiency of the whole record to justify its decision,
the Courts must pass."'122
As pointed out, supra, where an employer's state of mind including moti-
vation is in issue, it can only be established by circumstantial evidence.
Discriminatory discharge cases, for example, involving violations of Section
8(a)(3) almost always include evidentiary examination of admissions,
opinions or views in the determination of bias or motive in effecting dis-
charge. A violation of Section 8(a)(5) which proscribes individual bargain-
ing and which depends completely on such evidence, could not be proved if
the Board was bound by the absolutist concept of Section 8(c). To examine
the issue in its broadest terms, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that
if an employer's views and other declarations cannot be used as evidence
by the strict application of such restrictions, establishing an unfair labor
practice would well nigh be impossible. 1
28
120. In construing violations of Section 8(b)(4)(A), the Labor Board said that to
qualify that section by the so-called free speech provisions of Section 8(c) "would
practically vitiate its underlying purpose and amount to imputing to Congress an un-
realistic approach to the problem." 81 N.L.R.B. at 812. Quoted with approval in
IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. at 704.
121. Id. See "Boulwarism" Legality and Effect, 76 HARv. L. REv. 807, 815 (1962).
See also 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 798, 799 (1965). NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954,
957 (2d Cir. 1941).
122. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. at 508. See also 63
Nw. U.L. REV. 40, 70 (1968).





Boulwarism as invalidated by the Court had two major facets to its bar-
gaining method, the "fair, firm" offer and its communications program.
The former standing alone falls far short of meeting the statutory require-
ments of good faith bargaining, because it represents a bargaining approach
that excludes meaningful union participation in the bargaining process, re-
duces the union's role to that of an advisor, and reserves to the employer
the unilateral responsibility for determining the terms and conditions of a
collective agreement. Moreover, the "fair, firm" offer embraces a prede-
termined resolve not to budge from its initial tender and, except for insub-
stantial alterations designed merely as window dressing, is in effect a "take-
it-or-leave-it" position that is patently inconsistent with the good faith bar-
gaining requirements of the statute.
Furthermore, one of the intended by-products of Boulwarism is the
emasculation of the union's countervailing power and, if given acceptance,
de jure or de facto, it could undermine the structure of a free demo-
cratic industrial society within which the statute must function.
In Response to Morris David Forkosch
Following the completion of this paper, Professor Forkosch graciously con-
sented to the submission to the writer of his companion article, Boulwarism:
Will Labor-Management Relations Take It Or Leave It?12 4 His paper
contains some conclusions which merit a more extensive discussion than an
addendum would normally permit.
Professor Forkosch refuses to join those who mourn the demise of
Boulwarism for a valid reason. He believes it is still alive and moreover
that it does not deserve the fate intended by the Labor Board and the
Second Circuit. He questions whether it was "judicially rejected" and
whether it was significantly altered, if at all. He concludes that "as of now
a good deal, if not all, of Boulwarism's tactics are still available, albeit to be
used cautiously. ' 125 To support this conclusion, Professor Forkosch correctly
suggests it is necessary that GE's overall plan, its technique and conduct, be
set forth in some detail, to be analyzed in the light of the opinions and hold-
ings of the Trial Examiner, the Labor Board and the Court. What fol-
lows this threshold promise however is a scholarly analysis of the ap-
plicable cases with a less than modest treatment of the facts. The con-
trolling consideration in most cases in determining bad faith bargaining is
124. 19 CATHOLIC U.L Rnv. 311 (1970).
125. Id.
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the facts, and as the Supreme Court in Truitt reminded us, each case must
turn on its facts. 126 In the Boulware case the facts and findings were crucial
in determining the legal issues involved, for which reason they are so
generously treated in this paper.
While the decision of the Court does raise some questions concerning its
reach, there can be no doubt that the bargaining technique embraced by
Boulwarism was found to be unlawful. "We hold that an employer may not
so combine take it or leave it bargaining methods with a widely publicized
stance of unbending firmness that he is himself unable to alter a position
once taken.'
127
The question raised by this holding is not whether the Court rejected
Boulwarism, but rather the extent and nature of the conduct proscribed.
Specifically, did the Board and the court treat the Boulware overall bar-
gaining technique separate and distinct from the three other separately enu-
merated violations. To put it more directly, absent any of the separate
violations, would the Board and the court have held the overall Boulware
technique an unlawful bargaining method?
That the Trial Examiner found the "fair, firm offer" bargaining method
unlawful is clear from his Intermediate Report: "The course the Respondent
chose amounted in effect to a unilateral determination of employment terms,
leaving negotiations thereafter, unless it deviated from its own policies-an
empty exercise with predetermined results.' 128 In a note to that statement,
the Examiner continued:
It may well be that any other course would have confronted the
Respondent with practical procedural difficulties in achieving its
aim for substantial contract uniformity in its multiple union re-
lationships. That aim, however, while entirely legitimate in it-
self, cannot be elevated to a principle excusing noncompliance
with good-faith bargaining procedures. Just because the Respond-
ent might find it procedurally inconvenient or impracticable to
realize its uniformity goal by engaging in full bargaining with
all unions before freezing its offer is no justification for its failure
to bargain with any one union-and particularly the IUE, by
far the largest union in its chain. . . . Effectuation of the Re-
spondent's private policies cannot be made paramount to the
Act's command. 2
9
That footnote illuminates one of the company's motivations in adhering
rigidly to its predetermined offer. Its reach extended not alone to the
126. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. at 153.
127. 418 F.2d at 762.
128. 150 N.L.R.B. at 272.
129. Id. at n.66.
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charging union, the IUE, but to all unions.
Any extended discussion of refined case distinctions and of peripheral
legalistic abstractions serves only to obscure the central issue in the case.
The central thrust of the issue is contained in the following unchallenged
key findings of the Labor Board.
As the record in the case reflects, Respondent regards itself as
a sort of administrative body which has the unilateral responsibil-
ity for determining wages and working conditions for employees,
and regards the union's role as merely that of a kind of advisor
for an interested group--the employees.' 30
And:
"Collective bargaining" as thus practiced is tantamount to mere
formality and serves to transform the role of the statutory repre-
sentative from a joint participant in the bargaining process to that
of an advisor.'
3 '
At issue is a method of "bargaining" relentlessly applied to each of the
100 unions representing employees in every corner of the country, where
presumably the bargaining issues as well as the countervailing bargaining
powers of each union would vary, and to each of which, notwithstanding
such differences, the identical "fair, firm" offer is made and successfully
imposed. No amount of tortuous distinctions between cases can support
the conclusion that such a method meets the bare good faith bargaining re-
quirements of the law.
In making an offer or acting on a union proposal, employers generally
take into consideration certain factors. These uniformly will include com-
petitive conditions within a given industry and an appraisal of the union's
countervailing economic powers. As stated above, GE is the most diversified
company in the United States, manufacturing products in 123 lines, including
almost every basic industry, and it deals with about 100 unions. Within
these industries, competition varies considerably.' 3 2 Yet, despite these bar-
gaining considerations which would normally produce variegated offers, GE
makes an identical offer to each of these unions and has made them stick.
It would do violence to reason to accept the suggestion that these results
could be accomplished through bargaining methods that meet the statu-
tory standards.
130. 150 N.L.R.B. at 195.
131. Id. at 195, 196.
132. The following will serve as a few examples of the industry diversification of
GE products: wood cabinets, business service publications, gravure printing, plutonium
atomic fuels preparation, industrial paints, glass, porcelain insulators, iron castings,
carbon and alloy steel castings, oil and gas fired furnaces, utility, industrial and marine
steam turbines, man-made diamonds, motors, generators, jet engines, aircraft propellers,
railroad locomotives, house appliances, television.
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Professor Forkosch raises the question as to whether the Court could
properly use either or both TILI offers as supporting evidence of a general
bad faith charge without independent proof of a TILL He argues that the
insurance TILI offer is to be considered as an objective fact, regardless of
intent, motive or state of mind, while on the other hand the Boulware overall
violation is purely subjective. He then concludes that a TILI offer there-
fore requires language in haec verba, oral or written, as an exhibit to be
the basis of a finding of fact, a factor not present in the overall Boulware
approach.3
83
The laboratory test required by Forkosch in effect postulates the unique
proposition that this element of bad faith bargaining under discussion, i.e.,
the predetermined TILI of an employer, may not be the subject of a Board
finding unless the employer included the TILI in an oral or written con-
fession. Even if this extraordinary rule of evidence had some case au-
thority or other support, GE's TILI has even met that standard unless we
challenge the well established authority of the Board to draw inferences
from GE's Lavish use of the TILI's counterpart, the "fair, firm" offer and
the totality of circumstances within which it is put to use.13 4
Forkosch's underlying premise that a TILI in the insurance plan is an
objective fact, whereas in the overall violation it is subjective, is an interesting
comment, but it surely has no evidentiary value. The Board just as fre-
quently as not makes findings by the application of subjective or circum-
stantial tests, including findings as to the motive or state of mind of an
employer.'3 5 Cases are legion where the Board in discriminatory discharge
cases has decided that the mere existence of a valid ground for a dis-
charge is no defense, if such ground is pretextual. 186 In making a finding
of pretextuality the Board may have an objective test such as a written in-
strument or it may have to examine all the circumstances and probe the
employer's mind, depending on the circumstances in the case. However,
whatever those circumstances may be, the Board's authority to make ap-
133. Vernon, Business Combinations and Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1969). But see Forkosch, Take It Or Leave it as a
Bargaining Technique, 18 LAB. L.J. 676, 693 n.70 (1967).
134. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
135. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 139-140. See 76 HAv. L.
REV. 807, 813 (1962); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 I-HAv. L. REV. at
1418.
136. NLRB v. Universal Packing Corp., 361 F.2d 384 (1st Cir. 1966); NLRB v.
Lippman, 355 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1966); Nachman Corp. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 421 (7th
Cir. 1964); A.P. Green Fire Brick Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1962);
NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Workers, 204 F.2d 883 (lst Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Solo Cup




propriate findings based on substantial evidence is beyond cavil.
There is strong authority for the proposition that the Board may take
judicial notice of its findings in antecedent cases as part of the totality of
circumstance in determining the good or bad faith of an employer.'3T That
being the rule, a fortiori, it may consider findings made in the same case
sub judice. Moreover, the Board may consider conduct which in itself is
protected activity but when considered in conjunction with other bad faith
conduct or in the light of the total circumstance may add up to unlawful
conduct. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed it, "The plan may make the
[protected] parts unlawful."' 8
The ultimate issue in any Section 8(a) (5) charge is whether the respond-
ent considering the totality of his conduct is guilty of bad faith in bar-
gaining. Good faith or the lack of it is a question of fact as to a state of
mind to be determined by the Board.8 9 If, therefore, GE's overall con-
duct was such that the Board can infer or conclude that the "fair, firm"
offer was the substantial equivalent of a take-it-or-leave-it predetermined
offer from which it would not budge, it may so find and the courts are
bound by such a finding if supported by substantial evidence.140 Con-
137. In NLRB v. Reed and Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d at 139, 140, the Court
stated the following:
... We do not think it would be error, in a case like this, for the Board to
take account of the prior history of the Company's labor relations, as dis-
closed in the prior record of which the Board might take judicial notice. The
ultimate issue whether the Company conducted its bargaining negotiations in
good faith involves a finding of motive or state of mind which can only be
inferred from circumstantial evidence. It is similar to the inquiry whether an
employer discharged an employee for union activity, or for some other rea-
son, where the prior history of the employer's labor relations, whether good or
bad, may be relevant.
See Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Here the Court re-
versed the Board's finding that Kohler bargained in good faith during the 1954 nego-
tiations because that finding viewed said negotiations in isolation, ignoring the
company's pre-1953 history of anti-union activities and the commission of three unfair
practices designed to frustrate the operation of the grievance procedure that was estab-
lished as a result of the 1954 negotiations. The Court said:
.. [t]he Board improperly ignored the inferences to be drawn from Kohler's
pre-1953 labor relations history in assessing its intent at the bargaining table in
1954.
Only compelling circumstances could justify disregarding the 'antecedent'
events in this record-repeated unlawful interference with employees' attempts
to organize an independent union and public expressions of hostility to
it. . ..
Id. at 706.
138. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. at 506.
139. United Steel Workers v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 1373, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
140. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The Fifth Circuit
had this to say about the availability of objective standards for determining good faith
bargaining: "The Truth is that objective standards are generally unavailable or un-
availing." NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960).
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gress entrusted the Board, not the courts, with the power to draw inferences
from the facts.
141
If the slavish adherence to precedents would produce results that may
do violence to the purposes of a statutory scheme, they should be abandoned.
Nor should acronyms like TILI induce stock conclusions without reference
to the entire course of conduct of the employer using it. Mr. Justice Car-
dozo put it aptly: "Weasel words will not avail to defeat the triumph of
intention when once the words are read in the setting of the whole trans-
action.'
42
This brings us to a most grievous error in Judge Friendly's dissent, which
receives the unqualified approbation of Professor Forkosch. The professor
would approve Judge Friendly's denial of enforcement because many of the
principles in the 1969 negotiations are allegedly no longer on the scene and
because "it is scarcely possible that the company's actions are so nearly
parallel to those of 1960. .... -143 To support this conclusion, the professor
recites the facts of the 1969 negotiations as he understood them from his
reading of the newspapers, a hazardous, if not totally unreliable, basis upon
which to urge the dismissal of a case.
It is the most basic hornbook law that an appellate court may not specu-
late on facts outside the record on appeal, except where the doctrine of
judicial notice is applicable. 144 Contrary to Judge Friendly's speculation of
facts and those outlined in the professor's paper,145 GE not only adhered
to its formula in the recent negotiations but did so in a more egregious
form 140 and this was the basis of charges filed with the Second Region of the
Labor Board and docketed under case number 2-CA-11911 on the day be-
fore the Court's decision was handed down, October 28, 1969.
Nor can the writer join with the professor in his judgment that the 1969
negotiations resulted in a New Boulwarism presumably based on press re-
ports that "hard bargaining" produced the February 4, 1970, settlement
after several offers by the company. It would serve no useful purpose to
deal with the 1969 bargaining in detail. The encapsulated facts are: GE's
contracts with most unions it dealt with were due to expire on October 26,
1969. Pre negotiation discussions on the IUE's demands started in May
1969. Formal negotiating sessions with IUE's coordinated bargaining com-
141. NLRB v. Link Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 597 (1941).
142. Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324, 336
(1937).
143. 418 F.2d at 774.
144. See 4A C.J.S. Appeal & Error §§ 680, 702 (1957); ICC v. J-T Transport Co.,
368 U.S. 81 (1961); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
145. 19 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 345-50.
146. See n.15 supra.
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mittee began on August 12, 1969. Long before that date the union gave
GE its proposals including 122 contract changes. After five months of
listening sessions, GE handed the union its complete "fair, firm" offer on
October 8, 1969.147 The day before, the company had already released
the offer through its official news publication. GE adhered to its offer until
October 26, the day after which all of the unions representing 150,000 em-
ployees struck.
On December 6, 1969, the company handed the union an "alternative"
offer.148  On January 9, 1970, J. Curtis Counts, the Director of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, entered the negotiations. 149 From
August 12, 1969, until January 9, 1970, the tenth week of the strike,
therefore, GE had made its October 8, 1969 offer and its alternative offer
of December 6, 1970. This was Boulwarism in true form. Beginning
with January 9, 1970, except for one committee meeting with the company,
the negotiations were conducted through the mediator until the fourteenth
week of the strike when GE decided to abandon Boulwarism. Boulwarism,
therefore, was shattered only after and as a result of 14 weeks of a na-
tionwide strike.
Whether or not Boulwarism will be resurrected for the next round of
negotiations or a New Boulwarism created in its place only the future will
tell. However, the lesson to be learned from the 1969-1970 strike is that
Boulwarism cannot function effectively when the balance of bargaining
power is restored through the coordinated bargaining of the unions it deals
147. The offer has been publicly referred to as the October 7, 1969, offer because
it bore that date. It was not given to the bargaining committee until October 8, 1969.
148. See Unity, the official publication of the Coordinated Bargaining Committee,
Vol. 2, No. 6, at 4. This issue published the log of the bargaining events. The
October 8, 1969, offer included a wage offer of 20 cents per hour increase for the
first year, and a right to reopen the contract the second and third years. The al-
ternative offer on December 6, 1969, filled in the second and third year reopeners with
three per cent each year. The Company termed its second offer as an alternative leav-
ing the union to choose the first or the second. The Boulware formula allows for
insignificant changes or alternative offers. See 418 F.2d at 758.
149. During previous negotiations, GE generally abjured "intervention" by the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service which it charged off to union invitation and
weakness. Federal intervention was not considered "new facts" as any development or
reason to change its offer. 71 LAn. REL. REP. at 195. Boulware belittled Federal
intervention. Their mere "availability" was "the next most effective detriment to any
meaningful negotiations." L. BOULWARE, supra note 13, at 141. Boulware boasts that
he was able "to avoid the needless delay in settlement" by keeping the Federal Media-
tion Service out, but was compelled by law to accept their services when the union
sought its intervention. Id. at 142. He considered Federal mediators as nuisances who
would occasionally ask for "some little something" to serve the union official's purposes.
Id. at 143; see 418 F.2d at 743. The fifteen week strike, however changed GE's opinion
about mediators. Mr. Counts was welcomed and given credit for making an impor-
tant contribution to the settlement. See Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1970, at 16.
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witlt 150 In the final analysis it was this aggregate of countervailing union
power that served as the inducement for GE to abandon its "fair, firm"
offer in the fourteenth week of the strike.
150. IUE's right to coordinate its bargaining with all other unions having con-
tracts with GE was litigated in 1966. GE bargained with a coordinated bargaining
committee only under order of the Court. See McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F.
Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Sec. 10(j) proceeding), rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d
847 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. granted and case remanded, 385 U.S. 533 (1967). The issue
was later litigated on the merits and IUE's right to coordinate its bargaining with
other unions was upheld. General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969)
enforcing 173 N.L.R.B. 46. For a review of the law on coordinated bargaining by
unions, see Abramson, Coordinated Bargaining By Unions, Proceedings, N.Y.U. 20th
ANNUAL CONF. ON LABOR, 231-52. See also Benetar, Coalition Bargaining Under the
NLRA, N.Y.U. 20TH ANNUAL CONF. ON LABOR 219-29.
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